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PREJUDGMENT INTEREST: THE ILLINOIS CONSUMER'S LOSS
by Jeffrey M. Goldberg*
I. Introduction
Plaintiffs seeking to avail themselves of the services of the Illinois
civil court system must invest considerable time, money and energy
in the endeavor. These "consumers" of the legal system require
efficient and fair proceedings in
the handling of their disputes. Ultimately, plaintiffs seek full compensation for the losses they have
incurred.I However, many successful plaintiffs may discover that
their investment in the legal system
does not pay off. In Illinois, statutory and case law severely impede
the ability of victorious litigants to
recover full compensation for their
losses. This impediment stems
from the inability to recover prejudgment interest, which is the
interest on damages from the date
of the loss to the date of recovery.
Clearly, if a person suffers a loss
of $10,000 on January 1, 1987, but
does not recover until January 1,
1992 and is limited to the same
$10,000, the person has not been
compensated in full. In addition,
this acts as an incentive for defendants to delay litigation since, in
effect, they have free use of plaintiffs' money. Consequently, the incentive for defendants to delay the
resolution of cases directly contributes to the tremendous backlog of
cases pending in the courts.
The deficiency is exemplified
where "A" wrongfully takes
$10,000 that belongs to "B." B files
suit but must wait one, two, or
more years for judgment. Meanwhile, A has invested the money at
10 percent. When judgment is entered without prejudgment interest, which is the current law in
Illinois, A gets to keep the interest
and B loses the interest his money
was earning for A.
A hypothetical tort case illustrates the problem facing the consumer who seeks redress for his
injuries in a court that does not
allow prejudgment interest. Suppose Stan and Oliver are driving
down a one-way street in their
identical 1980 automobiles when
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they come along side of each other
at a red light. As both of them wait
in anticipation of the green light,
Charlie mistakenly turns his automobile onto the same one-way
street heading in the wrong direction. Before Stan and Oliver can
react, Charlie crashes his car
squarely into both of the their
vehicles.
Subsequently, the automobiles
are taken to the same body shop for
repairs. The mechanic scratches
his head in amazement over the
fact that the two cars sustained
identical damages to their front
ends and he repairs the cars for
$10,000 per car. The next day,
Charlie gives Stan, his boss's son,

Prejudgment interest awards
would induce defendants to
settle cases before trial to
avoid paying prejudgment
interest, consequently
reducing the backlog of
pending cases.
the $10,000 to cover the repairs.
However, Charlie decides not to
pay Oliver. As a result, Oliver is
forced to file a lawsuit against
Charlie to recover the $10,000
needed to repair his car. After four
years, Oliver's case finally goes to
trial. Oliver is successful and he is
awarded damages of $10,000
based on the mechanic's estimate.
The problem is apparent. Both
Stan and Oliver received $10,000
for the damages to their cars, but
they were not equally compensated
for their identical injuries. Stan
received his money four years before Oliver, and a dollar today is
worth more than a dollar tomorrow. Oliver lost the interest that
could have been generated on the
$10,000 over four years. Calculation of a five percent interest rate,
over those four years, shows that
Oliver could have earned over
$2,000 on the principal. Further,
Charlie had incentive to delay the

litigation because he could have
earned that interest for himself
until the judgment was rendered.
A law that would require the
inclusion of prejudgment interest
in damage awards for cases similar
to Oliver's would achieve the goals
of fully compensating successful
plaintiffs and of reducing the backlog of cases strangling the court
system. Prejudgment interest is the
term used for the interest that
accrues from the date of an injury2
until the date of final judgment.
Damages that include prejudgment
interest award plaintiffs the monetary value of their injury from the
time of the accident until payment
of the judgment. At the same time,
prejudgment interest awards deny
defendants the benefit of the plaintiffs' income-generating money
throughout the litigation. Additionally, prejudgment interest
awards would induce defendants
to settle cases before trial to avoid
paying prejudgment interest, consequently reducing the backlog of
pending cases.
This Article takes a four step
approach in examining the concept
of prejudgment interest. Initially,
the Article details the legal history
of prejudgment interest. Second,
the Article discusses the evolution
of prejudgment interest in Illinois,
and highlights the outdated common law and statutory law on
prejudgment interest currently in
effect. Third, the status of prejudgment interest in other jurisdictions
is examined. Finally, the Article
advocates legislative enactment of
(continued on page 52)
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pending prejudgment interest legislation concerning personal injury
cases, and discusses the benefits of
such legislative action.
II.Background
Historically, courts viewed the
charging of any interest on money
loaned as illegal. 3 This attitude
reflected early societal beliefs that
compensation for the use of another person's money was reprehensible. In the first agricultural societies, those who borrowed money
were the needy, and the ethical
standards of those times frowned
upon the taking of interest when4
lending to a person in distress.
Consequently, the practice of usury, whereby a person received interest on money loaned, was condemned. Later, the ancient Greeks
and the Biblical writers adopted
these early beliefs, establishing a
solid classical foundation for the
judicial prejudice against prejudgment interest. Subsequently, this
prejudice became embodied in the
common law where it has remained entrenched in large part
until modem times.
It was not until the 1800's, with
the tremendous development of
industry and corresponding economic theory, that the public began to accept the practice of allowing interest on money loaned. 5
Once private enterprise transcended religion's dominance over the
economy, society began to view
interest as the natural growth of
money. Merchants required loans
to finance the creation of new
business endeavors. To obtain the
financing, merchants had to provide lenders with incentives that
symbolized compensation for the
use of the money. Eventually, society regarded the taking of interest
as corrupt only when the payments
involved an "extortionate" or "un6
conscionable" amount.
Correspondingly, societal perceptions of interest were reflected
in the common law. The liberalizing idea was the judicial recognition of compensating the wronged
party by awarding damages for the
lost use of the money.' Thus, in
1924, Judge Learned Hand stated
52

the following:
Whatever may have been
our archaic notions about interest, in modem financial
communities a dollar today is
worth more than a dollar next
year, and to ignore the interval as immaterial is to contradict well-settled beliefs about
value. The present use of my
money is itself a thing of
value, and, if I get no compensation for its loss, my
altogether
remedy does not
8
right my wrong.
Ultimately, the level of acceptance of prejudgment interest, and
the various situations in which it
was recoverable, evolved on a state
by state basis.
The present use of my money
is itself a thing of value, and, if
I get no compensation for its
loss, my remedy does not
altogether right my wrong.
III. Prejudgment Interest in Illinois
As the prejudice against interest
diminished in Illinois, two categories of cases arose in which prejudgment interest was recoverable.
Plaintiffs could recover interest in
cases where contractual parties expressly agreed to the payment of
interest, and where provided for in
statutory law.
A. Prejudgment Interest in
Contract Cases
Because of the common law,
courts initially allowed prejudgment interest only when the damages were ascertainable, or "liqui-

dated" at the time of the injury. 9

These cases usually involved contract disputes in which the parties
had agreed previously on the
amount of a party's potential liability. 10 Interest was allowed in
these circumstances on the theory
that the defendants knew the
amount owed, and they should be
penalized for not promptly paying
this amount."
If the damages were "unliquidated" or not ascertainable, courts
would not allow prejudgment interest.' 2 In these situations, the
courts reasoned that it would be

unfair to impose a penalty on a
defendant for not paying an obligation that was uncertain in amount3
until a judgment was reached.'
The defendants did not wrongfully
withhold the plaintiff's money and
they were unable to pay the plaintiff until the court determined the
amount.
Currently, case law suggests that
the liquidated versus unliquidated
theory is being abandoned, and
two new theories have arisen in
support of prejudgment interest in
contractual disputes. 14 These theories are known as the "lost use
theory" and the "unjust enrichment theory." The lost use theory
is based on the fact that a plaintiff
suffers the lost use of money between the time of the accident and
the judgment. Thus, prejudgment
interest awards are designed to
compensate victorious plaintiffs
for the money they could have
earned during that time.' 5
Under the second theory, prevention of unjust enrichment, a
defendant's liability is thought to
arise at the time of the plaintiffs
injury. Thus, the trial is merely a
determination, after the fact, of the
defendant's preexisting liability,
and any damages subsequently
awarded are considered the plaintiff's property at the time of the
injury. Therefore, any interest generated on the plaintiff's money
before final judgment would unjustly enrich the defendant, and
the delay caused by litigation
should not serve to enrich the
6
wrongdoer. '
B. The Illinois Prejudgment
Interest Statute
In 1879, the Illinois legislature
enacted a prejudgment interest
statute that offered several provisions for awarding prejudgment
interest. Specifically, these provisions, which are still in effect, allow
prejudgment interest on amounts
due on bonds, bills, notes, other
written instruments, money
wrongfully taken, and money withheld due to an unreasonable and
vexatious delay of payment." Although the enactment of the statute was a significant step in the
evolution of prejudgment interest,
there are a number of weaknesses
in the statute that leave many
Volume 4 Number 2/Winter, 1992
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plaintiffs inadequately compensated in civil actions.
The first weakness of the existing prejudgment interest statute is
that it exclusively applies to the
provisions specified. Traditionally, Illinois courts denied prejudgment interest unless a case clearly
fell into one of the statute's specific
provisions. Thus, Illinois courts
refused to award prejudgment interest in tort cases based on the
argument that if the legislature had
intended prejudgment interest
awards to be allowed in such cases,
they would have included such a
provision in the statute.' 8

Illinois courts have given
restrictive construction to the
statute's provisions which
could allow room for broad
interpretation.
Illinois courts have even given
restrictive construction to the statute's provisions which could allow
room for broad interpretation.
Thus, the courts construe the general phrase "or other instrument of
writing" to apply only to writings
sharing characteristics with the
written instruments specified in
the statute. Specifically, the "other
instruments of writing" must establish a legal indebtedness in
themselves, and convey a specific,
or implicit due date.' 9 For example, one Illinois court refused to
allow a letter in confirmation of an
oral contract to fall within the
meaning of "other instrument of
writing."'20 The court ruled that the
legal indebtedness arose out of the
oral contract, not
out of the confir2
mation letter. '
Similarly, the majority of Illinois courts interpret the statutory
phrase "unreasonable and vexatious delay" narrowly. Courts are
not persuaded by plaintiffs' arguments that the phrase should apply
to delay in payments due to defendants' initiation of legal proceedings. 22 One court held that if the
delay in payment is due to the
litigation process, the plaintiff
must prove "actual fraud" on the
part of the defendant to recover
prejudgment interest. 2 3 Consequently, plaintiffs' attempts to
Volume 4 Number 2/Winter, 1992

broaden the scope of the Illinois
prejudgment interest statute have
failed.
Further evidence of the statute's
inadequacy is shown by its allowance of a static five percent interest
rate. The legislature has not
changed the rate to correspond
with the fluctuating interest rates
in the market, or provided the
courts with a method for adjusting
the rate to match current rates.
Ironically, the only amendment to
the 1879 prejudgment interest statute came in 1891 when the legislature decreased the interest rate
from the original six percent to the
current rate of five percent. 24 Thus,
the statutory rate provides an inaccurate measure 25of the value of
money withheld.
Although the statute firmly established the right to prejudgment
interest in expressly enumerated
situations, the statute's inadequacies frustrate plaintiffs' efforts to
receive full compensation for their
injuries. Parties in actions that do
not fit into one of the express
categories of the statute fail to
receive full compensation. Moreover, parties who do fall into one of

Parties in actions that do not
fit into one of the express
categories of the statute fail
to receive full compensation.
the categories in the statute receive
interest arbitrarily set at five percent, a level that does not necessarily reflect the prevailing market
rates.
C. CurrentJudicial Trends in
Illinois
In Illinois, there is growing evidence that courts are attempting to
award prejudgment interest in tort
cases despite the statute's silence
on the issue. Because of equitable
considerations, courts are given
broad discretion in awarding interest and may give or withhold inter26
est as it deems fair and just.
Empowered with this discretion,
some Illinois courts have allowed
prejudgment interest in certain situations not specified in the statute.
Equitable principles have also
allowed Illinois courts to recognize
that prejudgment interest may be

appropriate where a fiduciary duty
or confidential relationship ex28
ists,27

or in cases involving fraud.

These courts have been able to
award prejudgment interest by basing their decisions on the statute's
language regarding "unreasonable
'29
and vexatious delay of payment.
These cases reflect the courts' dissatisfaction with the narrow scope
of the prejudgment interest statute,
and demonstrate their attempts to
achieve proper results despite the
legislative restrictions.
There is also evidence of a cur-

Courts have been able to
award prejudgment interest
by basing their decisions on
the statute's language
regarding "unreasonable and
vexatious delay of payment."
rent trend in Illinois that courts are
seeking ways to bypass the prejudgment interest statute altogether.
The wrongful death case of In Re
Air Crash Disaster near Chicago,
Ill., on May 25, 1979,30 is illustrative of this trend. In this case, the
court sidestepped the Illinois prejudgment interest statute and
awarded prejudgment interest as a
part of the plaintiffs' damages. The
court concluded that the absence of
a specific provision in the statute
does not eliminate an award of
prejudgment interest if another
state statute or equitable principle
3
provides for such an award. '
Thus, the court looked to the Illinois wrongful death statute which
allows damages that are deemed
'32
"fair and just compensation.
The court then held that prejudgment interest is an essential element of full compensatory dam33
ages and awarded the interest.
Moreover, the court found equitable grounds on which to award
prejudgment interest. The court
held that since there was incentive
for the defendants to delay the
litigation, and that the defendant's
liability was not questioned, the
plaintiffs were3 4entitled to prejudgment interest.
These judicial attempts to sidestep the outdated prejudgment interest statute demonstrate the
(continued on page 54)
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courts' willingness to allow prejudgment interest to fairly and
adequately compensate injured
parties. Legislative enactment of a
comprehensive statute allowing
prejudgment interest in personal

These judicial attempts to
sidestep the outdated
prejudgment interest statute
demonstrate the courts'
willingness to allow
prejudgment interest to fairly
and adequately compensate
injured parties.
injury cases would eliminate the
need for these creative approaches,
and would establish uniformity
and predictability on this issue.
D. Legislative Efforts in Illinois
In April of 1991, Illinois Senator
Rock and Illinois Representative
Madigan introduced bills to the
Illinois Senate and House, respectively. The bills set forth amendments to the current Illinois statute3 5 regarding interest on
judgments. The amendments provide that judgments recovered in
any court in actions filed after the
effective date of the amendment
will accrue interest from the date
the complaint is filed to the date
the judgment is satisfied. 36 Further, the amendments allow this
prejudgment interest to accrue at
the rate of nine percent per year.
If enacted, the bills could effectively modernize prejudgment interest in Illinois; however, the bills
are far from being passed into law.
On May 24, 1991, the House Judicial Committee declined to pursue
enactment of the House bill and
designated the bills' official status
as "recommitted interim study calendar."' 37 This cryptic status basically signifies that the bills have
been indefinitely set aside for further examination.
IV. Prejudgment Interest inOther
Jurisdictions
A. Other States
Legislative enactment of the
54

prejudgment interest amendment
would align Illinois with current
trends in other states. Despite minor variances, a majority of states
are allowing prejudgment interest
in a broader range of cases. A
review of other states' treatment of
prejudgment interest highlights the
current trends in this area.
In California, for example, prejudgment interest can be sought in
personal injury and wrongful death
cases under section 3288 of the
California Civil Code. 38 Section
3288 states that in actions other
than contract, "interest may be
given, in the discretion of the jury."39 The California legislature
enacted section 3288 in 1872, and
the section has never been repealed
or amended since that date.
In an even more liberal approach, Alaska has enacted a statute granting prejudgment interest
as a matter of right. In 1965, the
Alaska legislature amended their
interest statute 40 with the intent
that prejudgment interest be
awarded more liberally than previous judicial interpretations would
allow.4' The Alaska legislature recognized that failure to award prejudgment interest creates a substantial financial incentive for
defendants to litigate, and thus
defer payment to injured plaintiffs,
even when the liability is clear and
the jury award is predictable. 42 The
current Alaska statute imposes an
obligation on defendants in tort
actions to pay prejudgment interest compounded
from the date of
43
the injury.

In New York, as in Illinois,
legislators are continuing their attempts to amend current prejudgment interest laws to allow prejudgment interest in personal
injury cases. New York Senate
Judiciary Chairman, Christopher
Mega, sponsored a prejudgment
interest bill that would direct the
payment of interest in personal
injury and product liability cases
from the date the lawsuit was commenced or six months after the
cause of action arose, whichever is
later. 44 Unfortunately, the New
York bill has faced opposition
from the insurance industry, and
from the New York Supreme
Court Committee on Civil Practice. 45 Despite lobbying efforts

from the New York State Trial
Lawyers Association and others,
the 46
bill currently remains inactive.
B. Admiralty Law
Federal courts sitting in admiralty have a long history of awarding prejudgment interest. In 1818
the United States Supreme Court
stated that the true measure of
damages in an admiralty case was
the "value of the property lost, at
the time of the loss.. .with interest
upon such valuation. ' 47 This concept was reiterated in 1897 when
the Supreme Court stated, that as a
general rule, ship collision damages should be assessed as the value
of the property plus the interest48
from the time of the accident.
Later, the United States Congress
expanded the general admiralty
rule allowing prejudgment interest
in wrongful 49death and personal
injury cases.
Admiralty courts have justified
prejudgment interest awards because of the lost use theory. Admiralty courts view damages as sustained on a certain date, regardless
of when the court finally enters a
judgment. By awarding prejudgment interest, admiralty courts attempt to fully compensate plaintiffs for the lost use of the value of
the injury. 0
Nevertheless, prejudgment interest is not compulsory. In admiralty cases, courts retain discretion
whether or not to award prejudgment interest to compensate the
injured party in full. 5' However, it
is an abuse of discretion for admiralty courts to deny prejudgment
interest absent peculiar circumstances. These circumstances may
include delay in litigation, mutuality of fault, and uncertainty as to
liability. 2 Therefore, under this
discretionary approach, admiralty
courts are able to fairly and completely compensate injured parties
for the lost use of damages sustained at the time of the injury.
V. Beneficial Effects of Awarding
Prejudgment Interest
A. Injured Party Fully Compensated
The primary purpose of personal injury litigation is to fully compensate the injured parties for the
losses they have suffered within the
Volume 4 Number 2/Winter, 1992
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scope of their legally recognized
interests. 53 Accepting this presupposition as true, injured parties are
receiving something less than the
full amount of the loss sustained
when they are denied reasonable
prejudgment interest awards. A
judgment handed down several
years after an accident only provides the amount of damage sustained at the time of the accident.
The plaintiff will not recover the
money that could have been
earned through investment at prevailing market rates of return. Prejudgment interest can make up the
difference between the value of the
damages at the time of the accident, and the value of the damages
at the time of the judgment. Consequently, judicial awards of prejudgment interest based on a rate
consistent with prevailing market
rates will achieve the goal of
full
compensation for plaintiffs. 54
B. Reduction of Backlog of Civil
Litigation
Prejudgment interest awards in
personal injury cases can reduce
the backlog of cases that is currently inhibiting the court system's
ability to award full compensation
to injured parties. The backlog
creates substantial delays in the
judicial process. The statistics on
the backlog of civil lawsuits in
Cook County, Illinois are staggering. At the start of 1990, there were
67,776 lawsuits pending in the Law
Division. 55 Of these, 13,657, or 20
percent, were at least five years
old.5 6 According to recent studies,
the average length of time it had
taken a lawsuit to reach trial in
1988 was slightly more than six
years. 57 Further, compare those
statistics with the American Bar
Association's recommendation
that most personal injury lawsuits
should be resolved in two years. 58
These numbers indicate serious
delays in the litigation process, and
correspondingly, an ineffectiveness of the courts to fully compensate plaintiffs for their losses.5 9
One reason for the tremendous
backlog is that defendants have an
incentive to delay litigation. Due
to the enormous backlog of cases,
and the limited statutory provisions for prejudgment interest
awards, defendants, particularly
Volume 4 Number 2/Winter, 1992

insurance companies, can earn
huge profits while awaiting the
final judgment. It is standard practice in the insurance business to set
aside a "reserve" to cover unpaid
claims. 60 By not paying out settlements, and keeping these reserves
invested, insurance companies can
reap a hefty profit. Thus, it is
reasonable to surmise that defendants use a simple formula for
determining whether to settle a
case out of court, or to delay the
litigation as long as possible. If
defendants' costs are less than the
interest that can be earned on their
monetary reserves, then they will
allow the backlog of cases to push
the trial date back. To maximize
profits, insurance companies
would resist offering fair settlements before trial so they can
invest the value of claims and earn
money above what it might have to
pay in six years when cases finally
go to trial. If a plaintiff eventually
does receive a favorable verdict,
the value of the award is less than
the value of the injury at the time
of the accident.

Injured parties are receiving
something less than the full
amount of the loss sustained
when they are denied
reasonable prejudgment
interest awards.
The potential profit defendants
may earn can be quite substantial.
For example, in a case where the
damages were estimated at between 115 and 500 million dollars,
the court calculated the interest
that the defendants or their insurers may have earned, and plaintiffs
lost, was between 11.5 and 50
million dollars per year, or between $31,800 and $136,200 per
1
day. 6
Moreover, defendants who do
seek a settlement before trial typically offer a plaintiff a lower
amount than might be awarded
after a trial.62 Plaintiffs realize that
the settlement offer is worth more
today than the damages awarded at
trial would be in a few years. 63
Consequently, the knowledge that
prejudgment interest will not be
awarded as part of a favorable

verdict forces plaintiffs to accept
lower settlements, and therefore
receive inadequate compensation
for their injury.
One remedy to the backlog is
legislative enactment of broader
provisions for prejudgment interest in civil litigation. 64 Faced with
the prospect of paying out prejudgment interest, defendants will actively pursue out of court settlements, thereby reducing the
number of lawsuits pending. Prejudgment interest awards would
encourage early settlements by
eliminating the existing incentive
to delay litigation. If a defendant
has to pay the interest on the
money ultimately, there is no reason to invest the money and wait
for the judgment. In fact, defendants will have an incentive to
settle meritorious claims out of
court as early as possible to avoid
paying the interest that would accrue up to the time of trial. As the
number of settlements increase,
the backlog of cases should correspondingly decrease.
C. Jury Assessment of Damages
More Accurate
Those opposed to prejudgment
interest often argue that juries already take interest into account
when awarding damages, and if
prejudgment interest were allowed,
plaintiffs would be receiving double their damages. 65 Although
there is evidence which indicates
that juries may be calculating interest into damages, there is no way to
ascertain whether all jurors are
adding interest into the calculation, or how they arrive at their
numbers. 66 Judicial acceptance of
prejudgment interest would eliminate the arbitrariness of implicit
jury awards of interest. Courts
would be able to instruct the jury to
disregard any delay considerations
because the court would award
interest on whatever damages the
jury determined. 67 Thus, jury assessments of damages would be
made on a more accurate basis and
parties to the litigation would benefit from greater certainty in estimating the damages before trial.
D. Courts Would Have Discretion
to Award Prejudgment Interest
Critics of prejudgment interest
(continued on page 56)
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also claim that by awarding prejudgment interest, the roles would
be reversed, with plaintiffs then
having the incentive to delay litigation. 68 However, these concerns
are unfounded.
An analysis of cases in which
prejudgment interest is allowed,
such as cases arising under the laws
of admiralty, reveals that the
courts balance the equities involved in a particular case before
69
awarding prejudgment interest.
These courts carefully consider
whether the plaintiff delayed in
pursuing the litigation before
awarding prejudgment interest.
When there has been a delay in the
litigation, the courts look to other
factors to determine whether a
party is responsible for the delay.
These factors may include mutuality of fault, uncertainty as to liability and uncertainty as to the extent
of damages. 70 Other equitable factors may include bad faith estimates of damages, or any frivolous

claims."
Therefore, a court's consideration of all the equitable factors in
a case before allowing prejudgment
interest prevents plaintiffs from
taking advantage of the litigation
process.
VI. Proposed Modifications
for Prejudgment Interest
in Illinois
To facilitate judicial efficiency
in awarding prejudgment interest,
the Illinois legislature should enact
legislation that specifically addresses the inherent problems
found in the current system.
Bound by an archaic statute, Illinois courts are forced to limit the
availability of prejudgment interest in tort cases resulting in inadequate compensation for plaintiffs.
To achieve equitable results, courts
must formulate creative alternatives to bypass the statute. These
recent judicial efforts to award
prejudgment interest in a broader
range of cases are laudable, but
unpredictable. A new statute, or
amendment to the existing statute,
must adopt specific provisions
which recognize prejudgment in56

terest as an essential element of
damages in tort actions. Prejudgment interest is compensatory in
nature because it assists in placing
plaintiffs in the position they
would have been in if no injury had
occurred. To fully compensate injured parties, new legislation must
provide for prejudgment interest
as a matter of right.
Further, new legislation must
eliminate the fixed interest rate
and provide for an alternative index that reflects current market
rates. A fixed statutory rate does
not allow for changes in the economy. Consequently, plaintiffs may
receive more, or less, interest than
they could have earned on the
value of their damages. These arbitrary results could be eliminated
with the adoption of a uniformly
applied index rate based on an
established economic indicator.
For example, the interest rate
could correspond to the Prime
Lending Rate, or Federal Treasury
Bill rates. This would allow a more
accurate measure of the interest.
that could have accrued on the
value of plaintiffs loss through
investment, and at the same time,
allow greater predictability of
damages.
VII. Conclusion
Prejudgment interest is a necessary element of damages to provide
full and fair compensation for
plaintiffs in tort cases. However,
current consumers of the Illinois
judicial system are being short
changed. Despite encouraging
trends in other jurisdictions, Illinois courts adhere to an outdated
system that, in the vast majority of
cases, denies prejudgment interest
for injured parties. The Illinois
courts and legislature have failed
to recognize the costs associated
with delays inherent in the legal
system. By failing to award prejudgment interest, the system provides an incentive for defendants
to delay settlement at the expense
of injured plaintiffs. To remedy the
existing inequities, the Illinois Legislature must enact a statute allowing prejudgment interest as a matter of right in a broader range of
lawsuits.
Comprehensive new legislation
that applies prejudgment interest

to a broader range of injuries and
incorporates an appropriate interest rate calculated from the time of
the plaintiff's loss, would fully
compensate victims for their losses. In addition, such legislation
would reduce the backlog of lawsuits pending in the court system.
Until the Illinois Legislature
adopts such a statute, consumers
who are required to participate in
the Illinois judicial system will
continue to receive inadequate
compensation.
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